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Technologist · Chapter 8 · English

Chapter 8 — Security architecture basics

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Chapter 8 — Security architecture basics

Lesson map

Lesson 08 published. Map, example, EX022.

flowchart TD
  N0["Learning outcomes"]
  N1["8.1 Zones for NCS"]
  N2["8.2 Conduits"]
  N3["8.3 Why a DMZ"]
  N4["8.4 Defence in depth"]
  N5["Synthesis"]
  N0 --> N1 --> N2 --> N3 --> N4 --> N5
  N5 --> EX["Worked example"]
  EX --> Q["Exercise EX022"]

Logical drawing

flowchart LR
  N0["Learning outcomes"]
  N1["8.1 Zones for NCS"]
  N2["8.2 Conduits"]
  N3["8.3 Why a DMZ"]
  N4["8.4 Defence in depth"]
  N5["Synthesis"]
  N0 --> N1 --> N2 --> N3 --> N4 --> N5 --> Q["EX022"]
[Learning outcomes]
    |
    v
[8.1 Zones for NCS]
    |
    v
[8.2 Conduits]
    |
    v
[8.3 Why a DMZ]
    |
    v
[8.4 Defence in depth]
    |
    v
[Synthesis]
    |
    v
[Worked example] --> [Exercise EX022]

Learning outcomes

You will (1) divide a small facility into zones; (2) define conduits between zones with allowed traffic; (3) place a DMZ for shared services; and (4) explain defence in depth with concrete layers.

8.1 Zones for NCS

IEC 62443-3-2 introduces zones (groups of assets with common security requirements) and conduits (the communication paths between them). NCS needs at least four zones: office, refrigeration control (PLC-R1, PLC-R2, HMI-C), logging and cameras (loggers, GW-LOG, CAM-DOCK), and a small DMZ holding the historian replica and the remote-access jump host.

Priya's zone diagram showed rule 9 crossing office → control directly; because no listed conduit allowed it, the architecture document itself gave the reason to remove it.

The diagram also made the DMZ's purpose concrete: it is where office users read data without entering the control zone.

8.2 Conduits

Each conduit lists what may cross it. Office → DMZ: HTTPS to the historian replica's reports. DMZ → control: none initiated from the DMZ except the jump host's session to HMI-C when enabled. Control → DMZ: historian replication. Logging zone → internet: GW-LOG to vendor cloud on 443 only. Everything else is denied.

Priya's conduit table has five columns: source zone, destination zone, protocol, initiator and purpose. The initiator column matters most: replication from control to DMZ is initiated by the control side, so the DMZ never needs a rule allowing it to open sessions inward.

8.3 Why a DMZ

Without a DMZ, office users who need temperature reports connect straight into the control zone. With it, they reach a copy, and the control zone accepts no sessions from the office at all. That single change removes the path that most commodity ransomware uses to reach HMIs.

At NCS the reports users want are temperature certificates and compressor run hours. OFFICE-7's energy macro read run hours directly from PLC-R2 over rule 9; Priya's fix had it read the same values from the historian replica in the DMZ, and only then was office → control blocked.

8.4 Defence in depth

Layers at NCS: zone firewalls; named accounts; allow-listing on HMI-C; passive monitoring of the control zone; offline backups; and, outside the security team's control, independent ammonia detection and emergency ventilation. Each layer assumes the one before it can fail.

Priya's evaluation in Chapter 23 shows the assumption at work: five of six controls passed, but the camera-zone rule allowed CAM-DOCK to reach HIST on a web port. The other layers, named accounts, allow-listing on HMI-C and passive monitoring, were still in place while the rule was narrowed.

Worked example (synthetic NCS)

Priya draws the zone diagram and lists conduits in a table with source zone, destination zone, protocol, initiator and purpose. Comparing it with the current firewall, she finds the commissioning rule from Chapter 2 crossing office → control directly. The architecture document gives the reason to remove it: it is not a listed conduit.

Synthetic case — Northgate Cold Storage. The zones are a teaching design.

Errors and limits

Zones on paper mean nothing until enforced in switches and firewalls. Cameras often get forgotten; they are network devices with their own vulnerabilities and belong in a zone too.

Exercises

Synthesis

Zones, conduits and a DMZ convert "segment the network" into a checkable design, and defence in depth makes each layer's failure survivable.

Continue studying — chapter 08 of 30

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