Chapter 7 — Contractor and vendor remote access
Lesson map
Lesson 07 published. Map, example, EX031.
flowchart TD
N0["Learning outcomes"]
N1["7.1 Many hands"]
N2["7.2 Lessons from AA21-042A"]
N3["7.3 A controlled process"]
N4["7.4 Removing the old routes"]
N5["Synthesis"]
N0 --> N1 --> N2 --> N3 --> N4 --> N5
N5 --> EX["Worked example"]
EX --> Q["Exercise EX031"]
Logical drawing
flowchart LR
N0["Learning outcomes"]
N1["7.1 Many hands"]
N2["7.2 Lessons from AA21-042A"]
N3["7.3 A controlled process"]
N4["7.4 Removing the old routes"]
N5["Synthesis"]
N0 --> N1 --> N2 --> N3 --> N4 --> N5 --> Q["EX031"]
[Learning outcomes]
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v
[7.1 Many hands]
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v
[7.2 Lessons from AA21-042A]
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v
[7.3 A controlled process]
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v
[7.4 Removing the old routes]
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v
[Synthesis]
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v
[Worked example] --> [Exercise EX031]
Learning outcomes
You will (1) inventory every remote route into building systems; (2) apply CISA AA21-042A lessons; and (3) design a controlled remote access process for contractors.
7.1 Many hands
A hospital may have separate contractors for BMS, chillers, lifts, fire alarms and access control, each wanting remote support. Without a policy, each installs its own route: a remote desktop tool on the workstation, a router, a cellular modem.
At Millbrook Aisha found four separate routes, three of them installed by contractors for their own convenience. None was malicious, but each was a way in that the hospital did not control. The first task is to list every route, with who installed it, what it reaches and whether anyone still uses it.
7.2 Lessons from AA21-042A
The CISA advisory on the 2021 compromise of a U.S. water treatment facility describes remote access software being used to reach a control system. Its recommendations include multi-factor authentication, strong remote desktop passwords, closing unused remote desktop ports and auditing remote connections. MITRE ATT&CK for ICS describes misuse of such routes as T0886 Remote Services.
For Millbrook the lessons map directly onto the routes Aisha found. A remote desktop tool on BMS-WS is the same kind of route described in the advisory. Requiring multi-factor authentication, auditing connections and closing unused remote desktop access are practical steps estates and the contractors can agree, without waiting for a larger project.
7.3 A controlled process
One hospital-owned remote access gateway; a named, multi-factor account for each contractor engineer; accounts disabled by default and enabled per ticket; access limited to the specific system the contractor maintains; sessions recorded where possible; the account disabled when the session ends.
Write the process in a short document that contractors sign, so they know how to get access in an emergency as well as for planned work. Test it once with each contractor before the old routes are removed. Review gateway accounts weekly, because accounts left enabled after a session are themselves a finding, as Millbrook's risk report later shows.
7.4 Removing the old routes
Once the gateway is in place, remove remote desktop tools installed directly on building workstations and disconnect unmanaged modems — in agreement with the contractor and estates, at a planned time, so support is not lost during an emergency.
At Millbrook the order was agreed with estates: the remote desktop tool was removed only after the BMS contractor's gateway account worked, the chiller router a week later, and the lift link restricted rather than removed. Record each removal with the date and who confirmed it, then check the route inventory again to make sure nothing has reappeared.
Worked example (synthetic Millbrook)
Aisha's route inventory finds four ways in: the gateway, a remote desktop tool on BMS-WS installed by the BMS contractor, the lift's cellular link, and a chiller vendor's router. Estates agrees a plan: the remote desktop tool is removed in week 1 after the contractor's gateway account works; the chiller router in week 2; the lift link is restricted to the lift contractor's service centre with a ticket requirement.
Synthetic case — Millbrook. Routes and timing are invented.
Errors and limits
Some lift and fire alarm links are required for safety monitoring; restrict and record them rather than removing them blindly.
Exercises
- EX031 — Counting routes. List the four remote routes Aisha found. Rubric: 3 = gateway, remote desktop on BMS-WS, lift cellular, chiller router; 2 = three; 1 = one; 0 = none.
- EX032 — Applying the advisory. Apply two AA21-042A recommendations to the BMS contractor's access. Rubric: 3 = MFA on gateway account and audit of sessions (or close RDP port/strong password); 2 = one; 1 = vague; 0 = none.
- EX033 — Per-system limits. Why should the chiller contractor's account not reach the access control server? Rubric: 3 = least privilege; compromise of one contractor limited to its system; 2 = partial; 1 = no reason; 0 = none.
- EX034 — Removal timing. Why is the remote desktop tool removed only after the gateway account works? Rubric: 3 = avoid losing support during an emergency; test replacement first; 2 = partial; 1 = no reason; 0 = none.
- EX035 — Safety link. The fire alarm monitoring link uses a cellular modem. Should it be unplugged? Rubric: 3 = no; safety monitoring; restrict, document and review with owner; 2 = no only; 1 = yes; 0 = none.
Synthesis
All remote help goes through one gateway with named, multi-factor, ticketed accounts; legacy routes are retired carefully.
Continue studying — chapter 07 of 12
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